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The concept of dynamic coalitions (also virtual organizations) describes the temporary interconnec-
tion of autonomous agents, who share information or resources in order to achieve a common goal.
Through modern technologies these coalitions may form across company, organization and system
borders. Therefor questions of access control and security are of vital significance for the architec-
tures supporting these coalitions.
In this paper, we present our first steps to reach a formal framework for modeling and verifying
the design of privacy-sensitive dynamic coalition infrastructures and their processes. In order to do
so we extend existing dynamic coalition modeling approaches with an access-control-concept, which
manages access to information through policies. Furthermore we regard the processes underlying
these coalitions and present first works in formalizing these processes. As a result of the present
paper we illustrate the usefulness of the Abstract State Machine (ASM) method for this task. We
demonstrate a formal treatment of privacy-sensitive dynamic coalitions by two example ASMs which
model certain access control situations. A logical consideration of these ASMs can lead to a better
understanding and a verification of the ASMs according to the aspired specification.
1 Introduction
Modern technologies like service-oriented architectures, online social networks, web 2.0, etc. allow for
companies and organizations to form dynamic coalitions across their own system borders. A dynamic
coalition first off is a group of through network technologies (temporary) interconnected autonomous
agents, who share their resources or information in order to reach a common goal. Although each coali-
tion exhibits unique features there exist certain common features like dynamically changing membership,
data-transfer mechanisms and authorization structures. Companies cooperating in order to exploit a tem-
porary market chance or the cooperation of emergency services, military and civilian institutions during
a crisis are popular examples for dynamic coalitions.
In most scenarios different institutions have to share and transfer critical information, which raises
significance for questions of information flow, security, privacy and trust. In security and privacy critical
fields like in the health sector the solving of the question may determine the success of complete software
engineering projects. Nevertheless software architects today still lack formal frameworks and methods to
evaluate policy decisions at design time and thereby examine their consequences for the to-be-deployed
architecture.
In [5] Bryans et al. present formal modeling technologies in order to approach a formal framework
for dynamic coalitions. With the specification language VDM1 they create a basic formal model of
dynamic coalitions, consisting of various dimensions, where each dimension represents a certain per-
spective which could be considered by a software architect. According to object oriented paradigms the
1Vienna Development Method: http://www.vdmportal.org/twiki/bin/view
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models consist of data types as well as operations and invariants over these types. In [8] the authors
demonstrate the practicability of their modeling approach.
In other works independent of dynamic coalition researches the same authors present concepts for
modeling Access-Control-Policies in VDM. Therefor they translate core components of the OASIS2-
standard XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language into a VDM-Notation. In an outlook
they propose the combination of this approach with the modeling of dynamic coalitions [7].
Modeling and testing of proposed software architectures with respect to their access control policies
is of great importance, especially in dynamic coalitions: Different access control policies of certain
agents may result in processes that do not run smoothly or prevent the processes from running at all.
Bryans et al. therefor present a concept of evolution of access control policies in dynamic coalitions
(see figure 1). In this concept a process with certain access control requirements is generated through
coalition consensus. With the supposed formal framework agents may investigate these access control
requirements and even simulate the impact on their own architecture, thereby being able to detect and
avert errors or contradictions.
Figure 1: Evolution of access control policies in dynamic coalitions taken from [7]
Since one of the authors is affiliated with the SOAMED Graduate College3, a graduate college dedi-
cated to ”Service-oriented Architectures for the Integration of Software-based Processes exemplified by
Health Care Systems and Medical Technology” medical scenarios are of great interest to the authors.
In health care systems dynamic factors of coalitions are of great importance. Possibilities of modern
networking technologies call for new organizational concepts apart from traditional static concepts like
clinical pathways. For example, patient care itself could be seen as a dynamic coalition:
During the treatment in one or several hospitals the patient has to pass through various
station and organizational units. These departments are often not only spatially separated,
2OASIS is a consortium for advancing open standards for information society. See: http://www.oasis-open.org/.
3For more Information on SOAMED see: http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/forschung/gebiete/
soamed-en/willkommen-en.
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but also technology wise, acting as separate, autonomous instances, which create there own
reports and diagnoses which are transferred to the other instances (up to this day still mostly
on paper).
In this paper we present our approach of integrating the above-described modeling concepts for ac-
cess control and dynamic coalitions. Speaking in terms of Bryans et al. we thereby examine the dimen-
sion access control. The models of Bryans et al. solely address structural aspects of dynamic coalitions.
Exceeding these structural features the consideration of coalition processes is of high significance in
dynamic coalitions. In the core of this paper we discuss how Abstract State Machines (ASMs) may be
utilized to enrich the models of Bryans et al. with formal process aspects. The modified VDM-model
is considered as the underlying state and processes may be represented as state transitions in the ASM.
We provide two examples of access control situations in dynamic coalitions in the formal method of
ASMs which shall illustrate the usefulness of a formal treatment and consideration of access control
situations. By the verification of certain liveness and safety properties we can furthermore guarantee or
check specific properties of the ASMs in the first place.
2 Related Work
In recent years several formalizations of single aspects of dynamic coalitions have been presented. Haidar
et al. propose a formal model for PKI-based authentication in dynamic coalitions on the basis of a process
calculus and the formal description language Z [13]. Bocchi et al. present formal description approaches
for breeding environments in virtual organizations, which may be notably relevant in grid-computing.
As mentioned above, Bryans et al. contributed various models for dynamic coalitions by means of
the specification language VDM (see [8, 7, 4, 5]) . However those approaches only cover structural
aspects of dynamic coalition. Process properties and workflows have to be simulated using external (for
example java-based) tools to modify a state that is based on a VDM-model structure. Our work extends
this approach in so far as in that we pursue a formal modeling framework in which both structure and
process properties can be formalized in a single formalism (e.g. Abstract State Machines) and thereby
create the means to formally analyze dynamic coalitions with the underlying processes.
Other than the taxonomies of Bryans et al. only few holistic modeling approaches for dynamic
coalition exist. The work most alike to ours can be found in [18]. Here McGinnis et al. describe a
formal framework for virtual organizations in service-grid-environments. The framework catches formal
descriptions of agents, services, roles and work flows. The used modeling techniques are not based on
standards that we know of. Tool-support in creation and evaluation of dynamic coalitions design, as
proposed by us, is therefor only hardly imaginable. Koshutanski et al. model HDC (highly dynamic
coalitions), a subclass of dynamic coalitions, defined by them as coalitions with extremely short life
time. They also do not make use of any modeling standard, which might create problems in critical
application fields like crisis management or the health sector. Furthermore their model assumes a central
management of the coalition in form of a coalition platform. Both limitations are too restrictive for the
application scenarios we are envisioning.
Other approaches present informal models from the view of economic sciences. [14, 17].
3 Basics
In the following we want to describe the basic concepts which are essential for the understanding of
the model as to be presented in this paper. In the first subsection we give a short introduction into the
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modeling language VDM. In the second subsection we provide the model for dynamic coaliation as
described in [8]. In the third part we give a brief introduction to the OASIS XACML standard, for which
there also exists a VDM specification.
3.1 VDM and VDM++
The model to be introduced in the present paper is specified in the object-oriented extension of the Vienna
Development Method (VDM), called VDM++. This language specifies data, states and functionality and
is well suited for the modeling of the structures and functions of dynamic coalitions.[11, 9].
A VDM-Model consists of definitions of classes in which instance variables, types and functionality
are specified. Here instance variables are the local variables of an object. Types can be defined as being
free of structure (called token) or as complex. Functionality can be specified through functions over
the instance variables or through helping functions, which leave the local variables untouched. The use
of operations and functions can be limited through the statement of pre- and post-conditions. VDM is
widely used method in the modeling of computer-related systems [16, 10] and adequately supported by
tools like for example the VDMTools which were used for the present paper.
3.2 Dynamic coalitions in VDM
The VDM model for dynamic coalitions as introduced by Bryans et al. consists basically of agents, which
can enter or leave certain groups of agents, which are named coalitions. Agents carry a set of information
which can be shared with other agents or coalitions. Based on these conceptions [5] introduces certain
different dimensions of dynamic coalitions for the modeling of seven further aspects like for example
exchanging of information, memberships of coalitions and structures of authorization. The practical
usefulness of these models was proven by certain industrial ([8]) and military ([4]) case studies.
In [1] we extended this basis model of dynamic coalitions by methods for a handling of access-
control. In this respect our approach can be seen as another new dimension of dynamic coalitions: the
dimension of access-control.
3.3 XACML in VDM
XACML is an OASIS standard based on XML for the description and definition of access-control-
policies in distributed systems. A simplified visualization of the functioning of XACML policies can
be found in figure 2. Requests for access to certain resources are picked up by the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) and send to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) as a standardized XACML request. As holder of
the policies it is up to the PDP who check whether an access is to be permitted or to be denied and sends
this information to the PEP which is responsible for the granting or denying of access to the resource.
3.4 Abstract State Machines
The concept of abstract state machines (ASMs) (see for example [3, 12]) allows for a formal representa-
tion of computable and non-computable algorithms. Here the concept of ASMs is rather free as it allows
for a direct use of specification languages (like for example VDM) as underlying languages of the ASMs.
ASMs offer a mathematical framework which allows for a reliable formal modeling of processes. Any
ASM is based on the concept of states in which the ASM can occur. Here any state is modeled as a
specification of the underlying specification language. State transitions are modeled over rules which
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Figure 2: Simplified presentation of XACML-architecture.
change the definitions of the functions included in the specification. This change takes place via an up-
date operation, which overwrites the result of the function for a certain set of arguments. Thus a state is
determined by the definition of its included functions.
ASMs allow for a logical handling in the sense that one defines a logic for AMSs in which formulas
describe certain states and conditions of the ASM. As a result of the present work we will show in
the next sections how two examples for a formal representation of access-control questions in dynamic
coalitions can be modeled and studied using the ASM method and its logical considerations.
4 Dimension Access Control: Our VDM state
In the following we present our basic state which is used for the ASM modeling approach in the next
chapter. The models are loosely based on the work of Bryans et al. [6] although it has been modified
and extended on several locations. At first we introduce the basic types of the model, separated in types
for the modeling of dynamic coalitions and access control respectively. In the last subsection we explain
some example operations on the basis of which simple access controlled information transfer within a
coalition becomes possible. 4
4.1 Dynamic coalition types
According to the approaches of Bryans et al. our basis state signature is based on agents which carry
information and may join forces to form dynamic coalitions and thereby sharing information at their
demand. Both, agents and coalitions have unique IDs (Aid- and Cid-token). The model abstracts from
the actual content and structure of the information and considers information as unstructured data (token-
type). Furthermore we add PDPs, both at agent and at coalition level, which host the access control
policies for later evaluation.
public Agent :: info : set of Information
aac : PDP;
public Coalition :: agents : set of Aid
info : set of Information
cac : PDP;
4The full model including a test scenario can be found under http://www.user.tu-berlin.de/nsarrouh/
ACDimension.vpp
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public Information :: item : token;
instance variables
coals : map Cid to Coalition := {|->};
agents: map Aid to Agent := {|->};
inv forall c in set dom coals &
(coals(c).agents subset dom agents)
The invariant (inv) states that only known agents may join coalitions. The PDP of a coalition and the
PDPs of the agents are related as follows: As soon as an agent shares information with the coalition, the
related access control policies are attached to it and stored in the coalitions PDP. This way access control
requirements of the agents may be enforced on coalition level.
4.2 Access control component types
We integrate the approach from [6]: According to the OASIS-standard XACML policies consist of rules
which in turn consist of an optional target) and an effect. Targets consist of subjects, in our case agents,
which want to access certain resources, in our case information. Actions define the type of access in
question, which we limit to read and write for sake of simplicity. When an access (request) matches a
rule target, the effect is being returned which may be permit, deny or not applicable in case the target of
the rule does not match the request. If a rule doesn’t contain a target it will be evaluated for each request.
public Rule :: target : [Target]
effect : Effect;
public Target :: subjects : set of Aid
resources : set of Information
actions : set of Action;
public Request :: target : Target;
public Action = (<WRITE> | <READ>);
public Effect = (<PERMIT> | <DENY> | <NOTAPPLICABLE>);
Policies are sets of rules including a combination algorithm which combines different effects in
case that more than one rule matches a request. Here we only consider the basic XACML combining
algorithms deny overrides) and permit overrides. Policies have obligatory targets, so that only matching
requests are evaluated. The effect of a policy is returned to the Policy Decision Point (PDP), which
combines the different effects to only one effect, using the above-mentioned combining algorithm. Each
request for access on information is evaluated through the PDP which ensures policy compliance.
public PDP :: policies : set of Policy
policyCombAlg : CombAlg;
public Policy :: target : Target
rules : set of Rule
ruleCombAlg : CombAlg;
public CombAlg = (<DENYOVERRIDES> | <PERMITAOVERRIDES>);
16 Formal Modeling of Privacy-Sensitive Dynamic Coalitions
4.3 Operations
The model operations CreateEmptyCoalition, CreateNewAgent and Join create empty coalitions, new
agents carrying information, and join agents to coalitions. Agents in coalitions may share information
(method shareInfo) in which case the matching policies are added to the coalitions PDP.
Figure 3: Visualization of shareInfo operation.
public shareInfo : Aid * Cid * set of Information ==> ()
ShareInfo(a,c,i_set)==
(
for all i in set i_set do
coals:= coals ++ {c |-> mu(coals(c),
info |-> coals(c).info union i_set,
cac |-> mk_PDP(coals(c).cac.policies union
GetMatchingPolicies(agents(a).aac, i),
<DENYOVERRIDES>))};
)
pre a in set dom agents and c in set dom coals and
i_set subset agents(a).info
;
If an agent wants to access information, the PDP will at first evaluate the request and then permit or
deny the access.
public RequestInfo : Aid * Cid * Action * set of
Information ==> Effect
RequestInfo(a,c,act,i_set)==
(
evaluatePDP(mk_Request(mk_Target({a},i_set,{act})),
coals(c).cac)
)
pre a in set dom agents and c in set dom coals and
i_set subset coals(c).info
;
Sebastian Bab & Nadim Sarrouh 17
The function evaluatePDP checks the combining algorithm for the policies and calls the according
functions. The single policies and rules are evaluated through evaluatePolicy and evaluateRule which in
turn use the according function depending of the combining algorithm to evaluate the effects. For the
sake of space we refrain from an explicit representation of all the functions and operations in this paper
and refer to the complete model descriptions in the internet.
5 Abstract State Machines
Abstract state machines (ASMs) offer a formalism for the modeling of arbitrary algorithms (see for ex-
ample [12, 3]). ASMs come with different forms of presentation of algorithms, including technical and
visualized presentation forms. Furthermore there exists a tool support which allows for the actual pro-
gramming with ASMs (see for example the CoreASM project). ASMs offer methods for a representation
of algorithms which are not necessarily limited to computer based algorithms, but instead of that allow
for the representation of other algorithmic procedures of the real world, too. The essential advantage
of ASMs for the purposes of this work lies in the freedom of using nearly any modeling language and
formalism as underlying formalism of a certain ASM. Thus it is possible to extend formalisms like VDM
by a meta-level consideration which allows for example to reason about a VDM model from a logical
perspective.
5.1 ASM Example
We now try to illustrate the applicability of the ASM method through a simple example for access control
in a dynamic coalition taken from [7]. This example is chosen due to the fact that it includes the essen-
tial questions and aspects of an access control in a dynamic coalition, while still being of an adequate
simplicity. Assume that a document management tool administers production plan and hazard analysis
documents of a chemical plant named compA. Production orders for chemicals are stored in an order
database and each order has to undergo identical production processes. Due to market opportunities
compA outsources the hazard analysis to compB, thereby forming a kind of dynamic coalition.
Figure 4 visualizes this process in the standard ASM terminology as introduced in [3, 12]. The
underlying structure is the above-mentioned VDM++-Model. According to common ASM-illustrations
we refrain from defining all functions and variables explicitly in this paper and count on the expres-
sive power of function and variable names. Round entities represent the abstract states, i.e. the whole
VDM++-structure, including instances for the agents, coalitions, etc. whereas rectangles illustrate up-
dates of these states. hexagons are symbolic representations of conditions. If-then-else-conditions have
two possible outputs ”yes” and ”no” depending on the Boolean expression inside the hexagon. The pro-
cess for the pre-production of a new chemical will start with the creation of a hazard analysis. According
to the hazard analysis and its recommendations the production plan is developed. Suppose that legal
requirements demand that compB signs off that all security recommendations of the hazard analysis are
properly implemented in the production plan.
Now suppose that company legislation and therefore the access control policy of compA forbids any
other agent but compA to access the production plan, which is reflected by the following two rules5:
ruleA1:= ( Target( {compA} , {PP} , {<WRITE>,<READ>} ) , <PERMIT> );
5In order to let ruleA1 be effective the policy will have to use the PermitOverrides combining algorithm.
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Figure 4: ASM visualization of chemical plant process with possible deadlock after i6.
ruleA2:= ( Target( {} , {PP} , {<WRITE>,<READ>} ) , <DENY> );
Because all shared information is stored in the coalition together with the according access control
policies, the depicted process will run into a deadlock as soon as compB tries to access the production plan
in the first condition (we suppose that signoff() will internally make use of the requestInfo()-function).
An ASM run easily identifies this deadlock. The resulting error will now have to be reported to the
coalition members who will now have to adjust their process or their security policies in order to make
the process executable. In the following process we insert another condition, checking if access to the
production plan is granted. If not an error message to the participating members will result and thereby
we eliminate the previous deadlock.
6 Logical considerations – Liveness and safety
The general method of ASMs allows for a logic based analysis of properties of the abstract state machines
(compare with [3, 12]). Based on the example ASMs of the previous section we now want to argue that
certain important properties in the modeling of processes like for example liveness and safety can be
described by logical formulas over the underlying specifications of the ASMs. Here liveness refers to
the property that the ASM is free of deadlocks while safety refers to the general absence of non-desired
states in the ASM. A logical treatment of questions of liveness and safety can be seen as an indicator for
the correctness of a designated ASM.
Consider for example the first ASM example of the previous section (as represented in figure 5.1).
As mentioned before this ASM cannot be considered as free from deadlocks as a rejection of the request
of compB for the production plan of compA does have not a solution in the ASM. The resulting deadlock
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Figure 5: ASM visualization of chemical plant process with new choice to avoid deadlock after i6.
however can be described by the following formula over the VDM++ specification which is underlying
in the ASM:
ϕ := ∃ord.∃HA.∃PP.(createHA(compB,ord) = HA
∧createPP(ord,HA) = PP∧ requestInfo(compB,coal,PP) = DENY
Due to the general concept of AMSs with their freedom of choice in their underlying specifications and
due to the expressiveness of the describle formulas there cannot exist a general algorithm for the test of
satisfiability of formulas in given ASMs. However, this does not imply that such a test is impossible
to define in any case. The structure of our example allows for a testing of the above formula ϕ in the
ASM as the number of states to consider is finite. It is obvious that the only situation in which ϕ can be
considered as a true formula is when calling the signoff()-function after states i6 and i10. Thus a logical
consideration could reveal the possible deadlock situation before an explicit test run of the ASM has to
take place. Doing that the ASM can be considered as not fulfilling the property of liveness by logical
considerations.
As mentioned before the second ASM example (as represented in figure 5.1) of the previous section
can be considered as free of deadlocks. Thus when attempting to test the validity of the above formula
ϕ in this second ASM the formula occurs to be false in all states and thus the ASM can be considered
as satisfying the liveness property. Logical considerations of safety properties include all the testing for
states of the ASM which are non-desired in the aspired specification of the ASM. Consider for example
the following formula ψ:
ψ := ∃ord.∃HA.∃PP.(createHA(compB,ord) = HA
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∧createPP(ord,HA) = PP∧ requestInfo(compB,coal,PP) = PERMIT
→ sendErr(compB,coal,PP))
This formula describes a situation in which the entire process is working as intended, but the system
nevertheless sends an error to compA. It is obvious that this formula ψ describes an error state of the
ASM which shall not occur as a possible state. Thus when testing the validity of ψ in the ASM and find
ψ to be false in any state we can guarantee a priori that this non-desired state cannot occur in the ASM
run.
Besides the mentioned aspects on liveness and safety there are further benefits of a logical consider-
ation of ASMs (like for example consequence relations or other meta-concepts) which lead to more deep
analysis of their structure and logical conditions.
7 Conclusion and open questions
In this paper we have presented a model in the formal specification language VDM, which may describe
dynamic coalitions together with privacy and access control aspects. Our contribution here is the inte-
gration of two existing modeling approaches for dynamic coalitions and XACML access control policies
respectively. Our next steps in this area will consider context-sensitive XACML as well as role based
access control (RBAC) for both of which OASIS-profiles exist. Both extensions to the basic XACML-
concept are of high significance in most application fields, i.e. in the medical sector as the main field of
interest of the authors.
Furthermore we have argued by our two examples of ASMs that the ASM method with its logical
considerations can be of great benefit for a formal treatment of access-control-sensitive processes in a
dynamic coalition. The VDM-structures serve as the basic states on which the ASMs operate. Here the
examples are meant as a first indicator for the usefulness of a formal treatment as provided by the ASM
method. However, it remains to define and study a general theory for a formal treatment of access control
in dynamic coalitions using the ASM method which is general enough to cover a wide range of access
control situations. These studies are part of ongoing and soon to be published work especially of the
second author of the present paper.
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